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NOTES
Admiralty Law/Workmen's Compensation-On the Waterfront:
The Fourth Circuit Draws the Line at the Point of Rest in a Narrow Interpretation of the LHWCA Amendments of 1972
The primary objectives of workmen's compensation systems are to
provide certainty of employee benefits and to limit employer liability;'
however, past attempts to provide such a system for shore-based maritime employees have entirely failed. A leading cause of confusion has
been the inability of both Congress and the courts to solve the jurisdictional problems of an industry in which the employees must engage in
repeated crossings of the shoreline between land and navigable waters,
the traditional boundary between federal and state workmen's compensation acts. The 1927 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) contained a bright line test of coverage based on
the admiralty law concept that federal jurisdiction stops at the shoreline.2 Subsequent attempts to provide federal remedies according to
the site of claimant's injury, rather than by the nature of his duties,
have often led to harsh and incongruous results.3
Despite the apparent rigidity of this shoreline coverage test, courts
have proved ingenious in blurring the lines among three possible avenues of recovery for injured harborworkers: the LHWCA, state workmen's compensation statutes and the admiralty tort law cause of action
for unseaworthiness. Uncertainty of coverage and competing remedies
that offer significantly different levels of relief have resulted in an
endless stream of litigation together with unacceptably high insurance
costs for the industry.
In response to the inadequacies of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, Congress enacted extensive
1. See Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 521 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir.
1975).

2. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat 1426 (codified at 33 U.S.c. §
903(a) (1970)).
3. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). In this case,
benefits were denied three longshoremen who were injured or killed when cargo hoisted
by the ship's crane swung back and knocked them to the pier or crushed them against the
side of a railroad car, while the widow of a fourth longshoreman whose decedent had a
similar accident, but was knocked into the water, was able to recover.
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amendments in 19721 in an effort to resurrect a viable compensation
scheme for the industry.5 In I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Boardc the
Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court to determine the extent
to which the 1972 amendments extend benefits under the Act to persons engaged in necessary steps in the overall process of loading and unloading a vessel, but who under prior law could only claim benefits for
accidental injury or death under state law. The court concluded that
coverage was limited to "those persons, including checkers, who unload
cargo from the ship to the first point of rest at the terminal or load
''
cargo from the last point of rest at the terminal to the ship. 1
t.T.O. and its two companion cases arose on appeal from three
Benefits Review Board decisions which awarded relief under the Act to
shore-based workers involved in various tasks in the overall process of
loading and unloading ships.8 Plaintiffs Adkins, Brown and Harris
were forklift operators who were injured while transporting cargo, each
working at a different stage of the loading process. The Benefits Review
Board concluded that each of these workers was a maritime employee
covered by the 1972 amendments.
Coverage under the 1927 Act was based solely on the place of
injury; recovery was granted if the injury occurred over navigable
waters.9 The present Act, as a result of the 1972 amendments, establishes a dual test for coverage. The situs test, the requirement that the
injury occur over navigable waters, remains, but the definition of navigable waters has been expanded by amendment to include adjoining
land areas that are customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing or
4. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (Supp. 1976), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
5. See generally IA BENEDICr, ADnmnLLTY § 15-30 (7th ed. 1973, Supp. 1975);
G. GIMoRE & C. BLAcK, Tssn LAw or ADMIRALTY § 6-48 to -61 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as GiLMORE & BLACK]; Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARrTIME L. & CoM. 1
(1974); Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683
(1973); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972: An End of Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for
Modern Benefits, 27 U. MAMI L. REv. 94 (1972); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and
Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
6. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for rehearing en banc granted, (4th
Cir., March 12, 1976). Judge Winter wrote the majority opinion with Judge Haynsworth
concurring. Judge Craven dissented.
7. 529, F.2d at 1091.
8. Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 301 (.1975); Brown v. Maritime
Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 212 (1974); Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 1 BRBS 199 (1974).
9. "Compensation shall be payable . . .in respect of disability or death of an
employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock). . . ." Act of Mar. 4,
1927, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1426 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970)).
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building a vessel.1" The second part of the coverage test under the
amendments is the requirement that the injured employee be engaged in
maritime employment. 1
In light of the new definition of navigable waters, the Benefits
Review Board held in I.T.O. and its companion cases that each of these
employees, having been injured over navigable waters, satisfied the situs
test.12 As to whether these employees were engaged in maritime employment (the status test), the Board held that any task that is an integral
part of the total process of loading or unloading cargo satisfies the status
requirements that the employee be engaged in maritime employment.1 3
According to the Board, the fact that the cargo does not move directly
between the ship and the storage area is of no consequence in determining whether claimants qualify as employees under the Act.'"
The Fourth Circuit concurred in the Board's resolution of the situs
issue,' 5 but rejected the administrative board's facile resolution of the
status question."' The court noted that Congress did not define what
constituted maritime employment" although it did include "any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations."' 8 Since
none of these terms have fixed meanings, the court refused to accept
them as reliable guides in ascertaining which tasks or functions are of a
sufficiently maritime nature to be covered by the Act.' 9 The case law
dealing with these terms is, according to the court, not particularly
helpful since the former test of coverage contained no requirement that
injured employees be engaged in maritime employment.20 The amend10. 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976) provides:
Compensation shall be payable . .. in respect of disability or death of
an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
bifilding a vessel).
11. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976) provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,
but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel,
or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small
vessel under eighteen tons net.
12. 1 BRBS at 305; 1 BR.BS at 214; 1 BR-BS at 203.
13. 1 BRBS at 304; 1 BRBS at 214; 1 BRBS at 202.
14. 1 BRBS at 202.
15. 529 F.2d at 1083-84.
16. Id. at 1084.
17. Id.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976), set forth in note 11 supra.
19. 529 F.2d at 1084.
20. Id.
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ments utterly change the significance of the terms "maritime employment," "longshoreman," and "longshoring operations." These terms have
become determinative of coverage for the first time.
Unable meaningfully to interpret the Act on its face, the I.T.O.
court considered the legislative history of the Act to ascertain congressional intent.2 Prior to 1972 coverage under the Act stopped at the
water's edge. 2 The congressional committees28 felt that this coverage
provision was conducive to anomalies2 4 since "[t]he result is a disparity
in benefits.

. .

for the same type of injury depending on which side of

the water's edge and in which state the accident occurs."2" The House
Committee noted that this disparity in benefits was becoming a greater
problem because of advances in technology that have enabled many
longshoring operations traditionally performed on ship to be transferred
to shore. 28 The Committee indicated that compensation for longshoremen should no longer "depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of
whether the injury occurred on land or over water."27 Although the
committee expressed an intention to create a uniform compensation
system, 28 its illustration of this scheme established that Congress did not
intend to cover all employees engaged in any activity on the waterfront. 29 Thus, employees involved in unloading the ship and those
immediately transporting the cargo to its storage area on land are
covered by the Act for any injuries sustained during these tasks.8 0
However, the committee emphasized that it did not intend to cover
employees who are not engaged in loading or unloading vessels. Mere
injury on navigable waters and adjoining land area was not sufficient in
itself to come within the coverage of the Act. Thus, the reports contain
the caveat that "employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored
21. Id.
22. The prior Act read: "Compensation shall be payable . . . in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States ... " 33 U.S.C.
§ 903(a) (1970).
23. The House and Senate Reports are virtually identical. Compare SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'

COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, . REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), with HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d

Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
24. See, e.g., note 3 supra.
25. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10-11.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
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cargo for further transshipment would not be covered, nor would purely
clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the
'31
loading or unloading of cargo."
The court considered the committee reports to be explicit in delineating which portions of the overall loading and unloading process were

covered by the Act.32 Those employees who transport cargo immediately from the ship are covered, according to the committee reports;

however, those employees engaged in transshipment activities are explicitly excluded. The court interpreted transshipment to mean any intermediate movement of cargo after it reaches its initial storage point.33
Checkers directly involved in the loading and unloading functions would
be eligible for benefits but clerical employees not intimately involved
with these functions would be excluded under the court's interpreta-

tion.

4

The court concluded that Congress intended to cover only those

employees involved in unloading cargo to the first "point of rest" as the
term is generally understood in the industry. 5 The court inferred that

this limitation would apply when workers are loading vessels, so that
employees moving cargo from the last point of rest to the vessel are
provided protection by the Act. 6 Applying this interpretation of the
coverage provisions, the court found that at the time of injury all three
claimants were performing duties landward of the last point of rest.37
The court's resolution of what constitutes maritime employment has
31. Id.
32. 529 F.2d at 1087.
33. Id. at 1087-88.
34. Id.
35. Id. The "point of rest" is defined by the Federal Maritime Commission
in its regulations governing terminar operators: "'MPloint of rest' shall be defined as that
area on the terminal facility which is assigned for the receipt of inbound cargo
from the ship and from which inbound cargo may be delivered to the consignee,
and that area which is assigned for the receipt of outbound cargo from shippers for vessel
loading." 46 C.F.R. § 533.6(c) (1975). See American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Bd., 317 F.2d 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DiPaola v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 311 F. Supp. 685, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see the proposed guidelines
for coverage under the LHWCA which the Department of Labor has issued:
Based on procedures normally utilized in the maritime industry, the loading
process may include certain terminal activities which are incidental to the
placement of cargo on the vessel. Conversely, the unloading process may also
include certain terminal activities. Terminal activities to be included in coverage under the amended Act are employees engaged in loading or unloading
breakbulk, containerized or Lash ships and lighters, or passenger ships. Activities which may be covered include employees engaged in stuffing and stripping
of containers, employees working in and about marine railways, and other employees engaged in processing water-borne cargo.
20 C.F.R. § 710.4(b) (1975).
36. 529 F.2d at 1087.
37. Id. at 1087-88.
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been termed the "point of rest" doctrine. 38 It is based on the presump-

tion that waterborne cargo leaves the chain of maritime commerce
when it is taken off the ship and brought to its first point of rest.
Likewise, maritime employment commences when cargo is picked up
from its last "point of rest" and loaded onto the ship. 0
The dissent in I.T.O. disagreed with fundamental aspects of the

majority's holding and with the analysis employed by the court in
reaching its decision. Judge Craven objected to the ready use of the
committee reports in the face of statutory language amenable to inter-

pretation. 40 He argued that the key terms "maritime employment" and
"longshoremen" have established meanings which preclude reliance on

the legislative history to achieve a contrary interpretation. 4 According
to the dissent, both "maritime employment" and "harbor workers" are

generic terms that include, but are not limited to, longshoremen,4 2 while

"loading and unloading" is an extremely narrow term and indisputably
maritime. Thus, a demonstration that these claimants were engaged in
loading or unloading operations, as these terms were understood at the
time the amendments were enacted, constituted43 sufficient proof to the
dissent that the status prerequisite had been met.
Prior to the 1972 amendments, "loading and unloading" was often
a necessary element in a cause of action in admiralty against a shipown38. Id. at 1096 (dissenting opinion).
39. Id. at 1095.
40. Id. at 1090.
41. Id. at 1094.
42. Judge Craven points out that the greatly expanded definition of "navigable waters" can be used to ascertain the meaning of "maritime employment." Id. at 1090 (dissenting opinion). As one commentator states: "Inhere can be nothing more maritime
than the sea, every employment on the sea or other navigable waters should be considered as maritime employment. . . . [IMt would be well to adopt a criterion which takes
into account the undoubted jurisdiction of admiralty in matters of all injuries on navigable waters." IA BENEDICr, ADMnRALTY § 17 (7th ed. 1973, Supp. 1975) (emphasis
added); similarly, Judge Craven suggests that longshoremen can properly be considered
a sub-category of harbor workers. 529 F.2d at 1090 n.4 (dissenting opinion). Another
leading commentator has stated:
First in the catalogue of harbor workers is the longshoreman. The longshoreman, as the name implies, is a shoreside worker whose principle activity is the
loading and unloading of ship's cargo....
Outside of the cargo work area in the holds, longshoremen are engaged
in various tasks in connection with voyage preparation or termination. The
work may consist of carrying ship's stores or passenger's baggage aboard ship.
Or the work may be performed entirely on the pier in the handling of mechanical equipment, or the storing, moving, or loading of goods on the dock.
1 M. NoRmis, TnE LAw oF MArIME INjURMs § 3 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis added).
43. 529 F.2d at 1097 (dissenting opinion).
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er for injuries sustained in ship's service.4 4 Thus, the courts had
numerous opportunities to explore the dimensions of the term and,

Judge Craven asserts, "loading and unloading' had acquired a settled
meaning at the time Congress considered the amendments. The majority
of courts construed "loading and unloading" in a pragmatic, realistic
sense. Rejecting mechanistic, hypertechnical approaches akin to the
point of rest theory, 45 the prevailing construction used by courts includ-

ed all employees engaged in the total operation of moving cargo from
the waterfront to the ship or vice versa.46 The dissent emphasized that
recently the Fourth Circuit had adopted this approach.47
Accepting arguendo that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, Judge Craven suggested that four considerations taken together
require affirmance.48 First, as a remedial statute,49 the language should
be interpreted liberally to achieve its avowed purpose of eliminating the
disparity of benefits received, depending on the side of the water's
edge on which employees sustained an injury. Given this goal of uniformity, those employees engaged in similar tasks and exposed to the

same risks would be afforded the same remedy when injury occurs. Second, Judge Craven argued that all doubt should be resolved in favor of

coverage.

0

The Act incorporates this presumption in section 920 by

directing that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a
44. Id.
45. One case adopting such a narrow approach is Drumgold v. Plova, 260 F. Supp.
983 (E.D. Va. 1966).
46. See Chagois v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970); Law v.
Victory Carriers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204
(3d Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); Hagans
v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963); McNeil v. Havtor, 326 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Byrd
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
47. Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974). The court noted:
The [district] court apparently concluded that "unloading" ceases when
the cargo is no longer in contact with the ship, i.e., when the bales were deposited on the pier and discharged from the ship's gear ...
[W]e believe
that the case law rejects such a narrow definition of "unloading."
• • . In view of the obvious trend to fully develop the humanitarian purposes of the warranty of seaworthiness we find no reason to apply a hypertechnical definition to the terms loading and unloading.
Id. at 234-35.
48. 529 F.2d at 1094 (dissenting opinion).
49. See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328
(1953); Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1951); 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion).
50. 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion). See, e.g., Friend v. Britton, 220 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
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claimant shall be considered to fall within the provisions of the Act.5 1
Third, "[a] consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference
by the courts."52 The Benefits Review Board has consistently held that
coverage can reasonably be extended to all those employees who are
engaged in integral and essential steps in the overall loading and un-

loading process. Moreover, the Board has considered and rejected the
contention of employers and carriers that a point of rest doctrine is feasible or permissible.53 The majority decision, in effect, overruled the
Board's conception of "shoreward coverage," as set forth in thirty-two
administrative decisions.54 Finally, the dissent argued that the scope of
review for these cases is a narrow and restricted one. 55 Thus, the dissent

would have held that the Board's rulings are conclusive except in cases
in which the record does not warrant the opinion reached or a reasonable basis in law does not exist. 56
The dissent admitted that the majority's reliance on legislative,
history might have been more palatable if it contained clear and unambiguous language concerning the issue. 57 Instead, Judge Craven considered the committee reports to be inconclusive, and therefore, useless
as an interpretive tool. 58
The critical passage relied on by the majority is interpreted differently by the dissent.

Transshipment Judge Craven argued, does not

51. 33 U.S.C.A. § 920 (Supp. 1976).
52. 529 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion), quoting NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67,

75 (1973).

53. E.g., Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 BRBS 31
(1975); Ford v. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 1 BRBS 367 (1975); Avvento v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 1 BRBS 174 (1974).
54. The Board had indicated subsequent to the LT.O. decision that it is "well
aware of the restrictive interpretation given the status requirement by the Fourth Circuit
However, we are of the opinion that our interpretation with
Court of Appeals....
regard to coverage is more in keeping with the amended statute and the legislative
history, and we will continue to follow the line of reasoning developed in previous
decisions. .. ." Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthey Inc., 3 BRBS 195 (Jan. 26, 1976).
55. 529 F.2d at 1093-94 (dissenting opinion). Prior to the 1972 amendments, the
review of compensation orders was assigned the federal district courts, 33 U.S.C. § 921
(b) (1970), where a very narrow scope of review was adopted. On appeal, the circuit
court of appeals adhered to a similarly restricted scope of review. The amendments direct the Benefits Review Board to review the Administrative Law Judge's findings with
appeal to the court of appeals for the circuit where the injury occurred. The amendments
codify a narrow review for the Benefits 'Review Board, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 (b) (3) (Supp.
1976), and remain silent concerning the court's scope of review. Judge Craven construes
this language to mean that the same narrow review exercised by the district courts prior
to the amendments remains the proper standard. 529 F.2d at 1093 (dissenting opinion).
56. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. Parker, 163 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1947).
57. 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id.
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refer to intermediate handling of goods once they are placed on the

terminal. Rather, the term refers to teamsters who normally are not
involved in the loading process at all and whose function is to transport
goods away from the shoreside terminal.! 9
More importantly, the point of rest theory is found in neither the
legislative history nor the statute.6 ° This concept, which in effect
defines which employees are to be covered, is conspicuous by its absense. Such a doctrine, unsupported by the weight of prior case law or
administrative precedent, is unfairly imputed to Congress in the absence

of a clear indication of such intent."1
Understanding the origins and interpretations of the first Longshoremen's Act is prerequisite to understanding the purpose of the

amendments. One of the first questions to arise when workmen's
compensation laws were promulgated in the various states was whether
these laws encompassed those harbor workers who regularly boarded
ships to unload cargo.6 2

Since these workers were engaged in an

extremely hazardous occupation 3 it seemed equitable that they at least
not be left to the not-so-tender mercy of traditional negligence doctrines
in case of injury.6 4 This search for equity was stymied by the Supreme

Courts insistence in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen65 that all things
maritime must be uniform.66

The effect of the Court's -ruling was to

thrust on Congress the responsibility of providing coverage for those
employees who passed over the shoreline, the Jensen line, as courts

labeled it, onto navigable waters. Enacted in 1927, the Longshoremen's
59. Id. Accord, GiMoRE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-51, at 430, where it is
stated: "Ihe line which the Committee Reports evidently sought to draw was between
workers who participate directly, or physically, in the specified activities and workers
whose jobs require them to be in the same area but who (like clerical workers) do not
physically 'participate' or who (like truckers) can be thought of as only indirectly
involved in the strictly maritime phase of the activity."
60. 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
61. Id. at 1096.
62. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-45, at 404-05.
63. There is no doubt that the occupation was (and is) a dangerous one. See
Hearings on S. 2318, S. 525, and S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1972) (union spokesman
citing National Safety Council reports describing the longshore accident rate as more
than ten times the national average). See also appendix to Justice Douglas' dissent in
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 218-25 (1971).
64. See W. PRossER, HANDBooK oF TH LAw OF ToRTs § 80, at 531 (4th ed. 1971),
in which the author refers to "Ctihe three wicked sister of common law-contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule."
65. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
66. Id. at 215. See also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewait, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
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and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act67 was designed to provide
coverage to those workers who crossed the Jensen line into admiralty
jurisdiction. Judicial interpretation of the Act proved a difficult task.
Jurisdictional problems have plagued the courts from the begining.
Prior to the Act, courts sought to soften the harshness of the Jensen
line by extending state jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. The socalled "maritime but local" exception that followed was intended to
cover those harbor workers injured seaward of the Jensen line, but
engaged in activities of such local character that the Supreme Court's
insistence upon admiralty law uniformity would not be offended by
permitting such workers coverage under local compensation acts.0 8
Considerable confusion arose concerning whether these cases were
still viable after the Act became law. Initially, the courts proceeded on
the assumption that the "maritime but local" exception was within the
intention of Congress, 9 with the result that certain claimants had no
idea in advance whether they were covered by -the state or the federal
compensation schemes. Instead of swift compensation, these claimants
were faced with uncertain court battles. A wrong guess meant, at best,
a loss of time and money for the injured employee, and at worst, a total
preclusion due to the statute of limitations.
The practical consequences of the doctrine that state and federal
jurisdictions were mutually exclusive was obviously intolerable. Finally, the court in Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries"°
suggested that rather than mutual exclusivity, there existed an area
of overlapping jurisdiction, which Justice Black characterized as "a
twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights determined
case by cas,."'
The effect of Davis was to give those employees in the "maritime
but local" category the option of proceeding under either the state!s
workmen's compensation statute or the federal Act. 72 This concurrent
67. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970).
68. See, e.g. Grand Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia 257 U.S. 33 (1921).
69. "'he 'may not validly be provided by state law' limitation in LHWCA §
903 (a) was generally-indeed, universally-taken to have built the Garcia-Rohde 'maritime, but local' category into the Act's coverage." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, § 649, at 419.
70. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
71. Id. at 256.
72. See Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683,
688-89 (1973).
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state and federal jurisdiction that existed for certain injuries allowed
employee freedom to elect the preferred remedy.7 3
At the time the Act was passed it was viewed as a substitute for
state workmen's compensation acts and accordingly contained the standard language of such legislation that the employer's liability was to be
"exclusive and in place of all other liability. ' 74 Despite this language,
the Supreme Court in 1946 allowed a harbor worker who was injured
aboard ship to bring a suit in admiralty against the shipowner based on
an unseaworthiness claim. 75 An unseaworthiness cause of action was
originally devised for seamen and included elements of no fault and
unlimited liability. Longshoremen were granted this cause of action

against shipowners on the theory that since they performed tasks traditionally engaged in by seamen, they should be afforded the remedies

that all seamen had in the event of injury. 76 Third party indemnifica77
tion was allowed in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
whereby shipowners collected from stevedores. Thus, circular suits
akin to three-party donnybrooks became a standard feature of longshoremen's unseaworthiness claims.78

In 1948 the Admiralty Extension Act79 was enacted to alleviate
some of the inequity created by the Jensen doctrine. This Act granted

admiralty jurisdiction to those injuries to persons or property on land
that were caused by vessels.

In this fashion, the unseaworthiness

doctrine as well as the Longshoremen's Act marched ashore though only
in a limited fashion.80 After some wavering, the Supreme Court took a
narrow approach to the interpretation of the Admiralty Extension Act;
it demanded a clearer congressional mandate before the doctrine could
be liberally applied to all longshoremen injured while engaged in the
73. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114. (1962). See also 529 F.2d at
1085 n.2.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1970).
75. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
76. Id. at 96.
77. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
78. "By the late 1960's further elaborations of the Sieracki-Ryan sequence had led
to the result that the longshoreman's employer had become, despite the exclusive liability
provision of LHCA § 905 (or the corresponding provision of a state compensation act),
ultimately liable for full damages in connection with injuries to his employees." GiLMoRE
& BLACk, 6-53 supra note 5, § 6-53, at 437.
79. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The Act provides: "'The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury,
to persons or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
80. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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loading process.""
Congressional inertia in increasing benefits under the Act and
liberal awards in unseaworthiness claims encouraged litigants to sue in
admiralty rather than go the compensation route. The resulting spiral
in costs caused employers in the industry to clamor for relief.8 2 The
rush to the courthouse also caused at least one federal district court to
complain that unseaworthiness suits were becoming a serious problem
83
because of their number.
The short, sad history of the pre-amendment case law indicates the
problems that overwhelmed the courts in applying the original Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The amendments
can be seen as a direct response to this history. 4 Thus, the most
important change is a modernization in benefits and an elimination of
unseaworthiness claims for injured longshoremen. 5 The other significant innovation is the extension of coverage shoreward.
The majority in I.T.O. professed to do neither more nor less than
the committee reports would allow8 6 and concluded that Congress intended to extend coverage for employees engaged in loading (or unloading) from last (or first) point of rest. 7 The dissent relied on an
interpretation of the Act itself,88 but even after examining the reports it
concluded that an expansive theory of coverage was required by the
89

statute.

As the first appellate interpretation of the Act's coverage provisions
as applied to shoreside employees, the decision is one of great importance. Virtually every circuit is considering appeals to Benefits Review
Board decisions. 90 The I.T.O. decision presents two approaches to the
question and differing answers to the problem.
81. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
82. Thus, an employer representative stated: "When insurance costs amount to
40% of a company's payroll, it is elementary that something is radically wrong and that
corrective action is mandatory." Hearings on HR. 247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006 and
HR. 15023 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1972).
83. Turner v. Transportation Maritima Mexicana S.A., 44 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). See also Hearings on S. 915 and H.R. 6111 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, "Crisis in
the Federal Courts-1967," 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1967).
84. See House Report, supranote 23, at 1.
85. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 905-06 (Supp. 1976).
86. 529 F.2d at 1088.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1094 (dissenting opinion).
89. Id. at 1095.
90. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 2 BRBS 99 (July 30, 1975), appeal

1976]

937

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Those who subscribe to a risk distribution theory might applaud
the majority result since the nearer to the water the employees are
working the more they are exposed to peculiarly "maritime' risks, which
historically are protected under federal law. Conversely, further inland,
the risks appear to be similar to those faced by any other warehouse
employee, and accordingly should fall under typical state workmen's
compensation statutes.9 1 Undoubtedly, this risk analysis would offer
small solace to an injured employee, for injury or death is equally tragic

on either side of the point of rest.
Employers will undoubtedly be relieved to discover that under
I.T.O. the number of employees covered by the Act will be far fewer
than that reached by the Benefits Review Board's interpretation of the
Act. The effect of this holding will be to lessen the amount of employ-

ee-employer contribution necessary to sustain. workmen's compensation
protection since state workmen's compensation statutes offer lower ben-

efits than the Longshoremen's Act.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of coverage will also avoid
some issues that a more liberal construction would encounter.9 2 Specifdocketed, No. 75-1360 (1st Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1975); Johns v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 2
BRBS 65 (July 11, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2039 (3d Cir., filed Sept. 9, 1975);
Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 BRBS 31 (June 26, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 75-1786 (7th Cir., filed Aug. 25, 1975); Skipper v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 1 BRBS 533 (June 11, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2833 (5th Cir.,
filed July 11, 1975); Powell v. Cargill, Inc., 1 BRBS 503 (May 30, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-2655 (9th Cir., filed July 28, 1975); Nulty v. Halter Marine Fabricators, Inc., 1 BRBS 437 (May 2, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2317 (5th Cir., filed
May 20, 1975); Ford v. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 1 BRBS 367 (March 21, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-289 (5th Cir., briefs filed Oct 2, 1975); Ronan v. Maret School, Inc. 1
BRBS 348 (March" 10, ,1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1445 (D.C. Cir., filed May 5,
1975); Kelley v. Handcor, Inc., 1 BRBS 319 (Feb. 28, 1975), appeal docketed, No.
75-1943 (9th Cir., filed April 28, 1975); Perdue v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1
BRBS 297 (Jan. 31, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1659 (5th Cir., briefs filed June 4,
1975); Herron v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 1 BRBS 273 (Jan. 23, 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 75-1538 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 7, 1975); Gilmore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1
BRBS 180 (Nov. 12, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-3384 (9th Cir., oral argument
Oct. 17, 1975).
91. In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), Justice Douglas argues
in his dissent that "because loading and unloading of vessels are abnormally dangerous
such risks ought to be placed . . . upon the shipowners ......

Id. at 218.

He later

states: "Statistical evidence suggests that the great bulk of high-risk maritime activity
occurs on the ship and the adjoining pier." Id. at 225. See generally Comment, Risk
Distributionand Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966).
92. The Chairperson of the Benefits Review Board has stated that "[the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act had such
far reaching implications in the areas of increased jurisdiction or coverage, benefits and
procedure that, even today, we have not been able to assess their full effects." R.
Washington, The Benefits Review Board and Its Role in the New Appellate Process
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and Its 1972
Amendments, 5 BRBS 29, 34 (Rel. 30, Maich 1976).
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ically, when is an employee's relationship with the overall loading and
unloading process so tenuous as to preclude coverage?
On the whole, however, the point of rest doctrine used in I.T.O.
creates more problems than it solves. Automation has dramatically
changed the workplace at the waterfront: 9 "[w]ith the advent of
modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use
of LASH-type vessels, more of the longshoremen's work is performed on
land than heretofore." 4 The Court's point of rest doctrine will have
the effect of excluding from coverage under the Longshoremen's Act
large numbers of employees who perform necessary and integral tasks in
the overall loading and unloading process. Thus, the following employees will be precluded from obtaining relief under the Act: "some
checkers, some hustler drivers, some tractor drivers, all members of
container stuffing and stripping gangs, and other terminal labor all of
whom are longshoremen and all of whom are hired through the union
hiring hall to participate together in the integrated process of the movement of cargo across the water-front terminal.""5 This result appears to
clash with the stated congressional policy that compensation should "not
depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on
land or over the water." 96
One of the most difficult problems with the majority's point of rest
theory is that there is no particular place where cargo is immediately put
at rest. Wherever it touches the ground it "rests" though only for an
instant. The point of rest will vary from day to day and from port to
port; depending on the type of cargo, the sophistication of available
cargo-handling facilities and even the whim of the employer.97 Employees have cause for suspicion when the limts of their federal
coverage, determined by the point of rest, are a matter of managerial
discretion. Ever shifting and amorphous in character, the exact point of
rest is bound to be a serious source of dispute. Rather than a guide for
administration of the Act it will be a starting point for litigation since no
93. "[Clontainerization saw the historical locus of longshore work moved further
inland on the waterfront in order to provide for huge equipment and parking areas to
accommodate containers ....
It is through the use of containers that the complete
turnaround time for a ship in port has been reduced from 8 daysto 36-48 hours." Brief
for International Longshoremen's Association as Amicus Curiae at 11, I.T.O. Corp. v.
Adkins, 529 F.2d 108) (4th Cir. 1975).
94. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
95. Brief for Director, Office of Workers' Compensatic.n Programs at 60-61, I.T.O.
Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975).
96. House Report, supra note 23, at 10.
97. 529 F.2d at 1096 (dissenting opinion).
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one can be certain of the dividing line between coverage and noncoverage. The Jensen line was undoubtedly too rigid and mechanical, but the
point of rest doctrine suffers from being so flexible, uncertain and
elusive that it borders on fiction.9"

Additionally, the point of rest theory is inadequate in that it has the
effect of erecting another "situs" requirement for coverage. 99

The

status of maritime employment is ascertained by determining the location of the employee's work, not the nature of his duties. The point of
rest doctrine "means that workers performing the same function, handling the same cargo, will be treated differently depending on where
they work, even though they are all working on the premises of a

terminal conceded to be within the Act's definition of 'navigable waters' "100 Under this anomalous result there will be times when employees moving the same cargo will be treated differently, though both
were injured in the same manner and in similar stages of the loading and
10
unloading process. '
Courts faced with the task of interpreting the 1972 amendments

would do well to keep in mind the jurisdictional problems that bedeviled

the Act in earlier years.

A modem compensation system loses its

efficacy to the extent that coverage is uncertain and conducive to costly

and time-consuming litigation. The court's resolution of the status issue
creates in effect a second situs requirement for coverage. The point of
rest theory advanced by the court draws an arbitrary line around some
longshoremen while excluding others on the basis that the cargo movement past this line is not sufficiently maritime in nature. This is a
fiction that can not be fairly found in either the statute or the committee
reports. The report so heavily relied on by the majority is singularly
98. Judge Craven argues that "tithe legislative history standing alone cannot
support the majority position. At best, the House Report matches its own ambiguity
against that of the statute. The majority opinion makes sense only when the legislative
history is paired with the 'point of rest' theory, a concept which appears nowhere in the
legislative history or the statute, and one which, I predict, will confound and perplex this
court for years to come." 529 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
99. Id. at 1096.
100. Id. at 1097.
101. To illustrate this anomaly, imagine a longshoreman operating a forklift transporting cargo from one point on the terminal to make room for recently arriving cargo
which is being placed at its immediate point of rest after being unloaded from a ship. If
he loses his brakes and collides with another forklift operator, the two employees would receive differing benefits by virtue of their being covered by different
compensation schemes. Despite the fact that they were engaged in the same work
(forklift operation) and exposed to similar risks (in this case, collision), they would not
be treated equally because at the time of injury they were assigned to tasks on different
sides of the "point of rest."

940

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

unimpressive as a guidepost to statutory meaning. The crucial language
cited by the court is capable of differing interpretations. A leading
commentator, in rejecting the committee reports, explains that "as essays
in statutory construction, they do not commend themselves.' 10 2 In
contrast to its indulgent attitude towards the ambiguities that abound in
the committee report, the court exhibited an unnecessarily rigid approach to the statutory language itself. Maritime employment includes
those tasks that take place over navigable waters. The coverage provisions can be fairly read to encompass all employment-related injuries that
occur within the Act's territorial limits. At the very least, maritime
employment must include all employees engaged in the overall process
of loading and unloading vessels. An affirmation of the Benefits Review Board in these three cases would come closer to accomplishing the
congressional intention of creating a modem, fair and workable longshoremen's compensation scheme.

BRIAN A. POWERS

Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary
Judgment
[PROLOGUE

As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held
in Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976), that summary judgment may be granted for the party with the trial burden of proof even when
he carries that burden, at least in part, with his own affidavits. Cutts v.
Casey was expressly rejected as not controlling since it involved a directed
verdict motion upon conflicting evidence on a strenuously contested issue of
fact.
In an excellent analysis that appears to adopt the federal construction,
Chief Justice Sharp concluded that a movant with the trial burden of proof
is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of his own affidavits when:
(1) there are only latent doubts concerning the credibility of his affidavits;
(2) the non-movant has failed to introduce any materials which support his
opposition to the motion or which point to specific areas of contradiction or
impeachment in the movant's materials and the non-movant has failed to
utilize rule 56(0; and (3) summary judgment is otherwise appropriate102. GiLMoRE &BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-51, at 450.

